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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Significantly, the insured, in its previous suit, had specifically
excluded as an element of damage that for which the insurance
company subsequently sued (loss of the trailer itself). The case
of Pearl Assurawe Company v. Epstein 21 involved similar facts
except that the insured had sought recovery for his entire damages
in his previous action. Also there was no evidence that the de-
fendant had any notice of the insurance company's subrogation
rights. The Court of Appeals under these circumstances concluded
that the rule against splitting a cause of action precluded plaintiff-
insurance company from recovering. Thus, it appears that the rule
against splitting a cause of action is not applicable where at least
a) there is a mutual exclusivity of the damages sought in each
action, and b) the defendant has notice of the insurance company's
rights.
Practitioners are therefore advised that if, in representing a
defendant, notice is received of the subrogation rights of the plain-
tiff's insurer (or plaintiff's assignee), such insurer (or assignee)
should be joined in a pending action in order to avoid multiple
litigation.
CPLR 3013: Court clarifies elements of cause of action versus
insurer for bad faith refusal to settle.
Recently, the appellate division, first department, further de-
fined the material elements of a cause of action against an insur-
ance company for its bad faith refusal to accept a settlement. Most
liability insurance contracts protect the insurer by providing that
the insurance company will represent the insured when he is sued
for matters covered by the contract. In return for the protection
the law has imposed a duty upon insurers to consider the interests
of the insured while representing him in settlement negotiations.
Today, in New York it is well established that an insurance com-
pany may incur liability to an insured, if, in "bad faith," it refuses
to accept a reasonable offer of settlement within the policy limits.22
This rule affords an insured who has had an excess judgment
entered against him (which excess could have been avoided if the
insurance company had acted in good faith) a cause of action.
Until recently, it was unsettled whether the cause of action
accrued when the excess judgment was entered or subsequent to
the insured's payment of such excess. In Henegan v. Merchants
Mutual Insurance Company,23 it was established that a cause of
action is stated by an allegation that an excess judgment has been
entered. The court reasoned that at this point the insured has
21295 N.Y. 674, 65 N.E.2d 325 (1946).
22 Note, Insurer's Liability for Refusal to Settle, 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
544, 552-56 (1968).
2331 App. Div. 2d 12, 294 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1st Dep't 1968).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
incurred damages, i.e., the judgment increases his debts, it impairs
his credit and subjects his property to a judgment-lien. Further-
more, a requirement of payment would permit the insurance com-
pany to take unfair advantage of the financial status of its insured.
ARTIcLE 32- AcCELERATED JUDGMENT
CPLR 3213: Procedure held available in suit on separation
agreement.
The procedure for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint
is available, pursuant to CPLR 3213, in those actions "based upon
a judgment or instrument for the payment of money only." A
speedy and effective means of securing a judgment, on claims hav-
ing a strong presumptive merit in instances wherein a formal com-
plaint would be superfluous,24 is thus provided. Motivated by the
rules of construction applicable to the CPLR, 5 New York courts
have generally taken an expansive view of this accelerated pro-
cedure.
Lacking specific indication of legislative intent, courts have
adopted a practical approach in construing the statute. Although
of recent vintage, a continuum of cases under the statute has pro-
vided clearly discernible lines of development.2 6  Invocation of the
procedure has been limited to those cases in which the obligation
created is not only certain but simple and absolute, i.e., free from
any condition or contingency.27  The procedure is thus applicable
to those situations in which the instrument is, upon its face, evi-
dence of a debt; evidence, not merely of the right of the litigant to
recover but of the liability of the defendant to pay. Thus, where
proof of extrinsic facts is necessary, such facts must be averred in
an accompanying complaint.
2, FIRST REP. 91; 4 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL
PRAcricE 3213.01 (1968).
22 Construction: "The civil practice law and rules shall be liberally
construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
civil judicial proceeding." CPLR 104.
2G The cases have been singularly consistent in their construction of the
words "instrument for the payment of money only." See, e.g., Signal Plan,
Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 23 App. Div. 2d 636, 256 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1st
Dep't 1965); Burnell v. Peoples Say. Bank of Yonkers, 54 Misc. 2d 140,
281 N.Y.S.2d 960 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1967); Vanni v. Long Island City
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 453, 278 N.Y.S.2d 988 (App. T. 2d
Dep't 1965); Embassy Indus., Inc. v. SML Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 91, 256
N.Y.S.2d 214 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1964); Lopez v. Perry, 53 Misc. 2d 445,
278 N.Y.S.2d 947 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967).
27The construction of the words "an instrument for the payment of
money only" has historical origins. For an identical construction, see Adler
v, Bloomingdale, 8 N.Y. Super. Ct. (1 Duer) 601 (1852).
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